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"There Must Be Some
Misunderstanding":Sir Edward Grey's
Diplomacy of August 1, 1914
Stephen J. Valone

For over two generations, scholars have studied Sir Edward
Grey's response to the Sarajevo crisis, apparentlyconsideringevery
aspect of his dual effort to find a diplomaticsolution while convincing
the cabinet that England must intervene in a general war. Historians
have generallyagreed that Grey's last hope to preventwar evaporated
by the end of July, although the cabinet did not decide to intervene
until August 2.1 In this light, the events of August 1, 1914, are only
considered to be either a prelude or a postscript to more significant
events. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that Grey pursuedtwo
distinct, yet interrelated,courses of action on August 1, 1914:(1) for as
long as he was unsure of cabinet supportfor intervention,he soughtto
make a diplomaticdeal with the Germanambassadorso that a neutral
Englandcould salvage somethingfromthe crisis, but (2) once confident
England would enter the conflict, he sought to prevent the war altogether by applyingdiplomaticpressure on France.
Historianshave overlookedGrey's diplomacyon August 1 primarily because of the cloud cast over the events of the day by the so-called
misunderstandingbetween Grey and the Germanambassador,Prince
Karl Max Lichnowsky. The first Grey-Lichnowsky exchange took
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place that morning when Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary,
brought a message to the German embassy. After subsequently receiving a personal call from Grey, Lichnowsky, at 11:14 a.m., sent a wire
to Berlin in which he indicated Grey had proposed that, if Germany
"were not to attack France, England would remain neutral and would
guarantee France's passivity."2 Three hours later, after another message from Grey via Tyrrell, Lichnowsky again telegraphed Berlin. He
reported that now Grey wished to make proposals "for England's neutrality, even in the event of our being at war with both France and
Russia."3 England was apparently retreating into isolation, leaving
Germany with a free hand to establish its hegemony over Europe.
Kaiser Wilhelm II understandably ordered champagne when word of
the second exchange reached him in Berlin.4 But such elation was
short-lived. King George responded to the Kaiser's acceptance of
Grey's first proposal by telegraphing that "there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation
between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon."5 In
the subsequent explanations given by Grey and Lichnowsky, both
diplomats insisted that a "misunderstanding" had occurred. Each maintained that Lichnowsky had not understood that Grey, in his first overture that morning, had implied that Britain would only remain neutral if
Germany refrained from attacking either France or Russia.6
The debate over this exchange has been mostly confined to narrow
ground: whether or not Lichnowsky misunderstood Grey's intimations. The interpretation that gained general acceptance in Germany at
the close of the war held that, on August 1, Grey had not suggested
British neutrality if Germany did not attack France; rather, Lichnowsky had misunderstood Tyrrell and Grey and had then not corrected his error with Berlin when he became aware of it. Weimar
historians were more vituperative in their attacks on Lichnowsky's
2
Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Berlin, 1919), 3, no. 562:66 (cited hereafter as DD3).
3 Ibid., no. 570, p. 70.
4 Harry Young, "The Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914," Journal of Modern
History 48 (December 1976): 650.
5
King George to Kaiser Wilhelm, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 612, pp. 103-4.
6 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, in British Documents on the Origins of the War,
1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, 11 vols. (London, 1926-36), 11, no.
419:250, n. 2 (cited hereafter as BD11). Karl Max Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss:
Reminiscences, trans. and ed. Sefton Delmer (London, New York, 1928), pp. 75-76.
There is no reference made to the "misunderstanding" in either the Grey or Tyrrell
papers deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). See PRO, Foreign Office (FO) 800/
35-113, 220.
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"blunder" because the Allies used his memoirs, which criticized the
imperial government for having frustrated the efforts at peace, as evidence that Germany had caused the war of its own free will.7 After
World War II, Fritz Fischer and his pupil, Imanuel Geiss, continued
the tradition of treating the exchanges of August 1 as Lichnowsky's
misunderstanding.8 More recently, Harry Young has written that on
August 1, Grey attempted to formulate an arret militaire between
France, Germany, and Russia, but that Lichnowsky failed to include
Russia in the calculations.9
Luigi Albertini provided probably the most noted rejection of the
"misunderstanding thesis." In his Le origini della guerra del 1914, he
argued that a dull-minded Grey blundered into proposing the abandonment of Russia through Anglo-French neutrality.?1 Edward Corp portrayed Grey in an even worse light. While agreeing with Albertini that
no misunderstanding occurred, Corp argued that Tyrrell persuaded
Grey to allow him to offer English neutrality to Lichnowsky because
he did not want England to aid Russia; in other words, a private secretary had convinced the British foreign secretary to offer Germany proposals which, in Corp's words, "made political and strategic nonsense." 11 Thus, the historiography of August 1, 1914, could be reduced
to a debate between those who say Lichnowsky was deaf and those
who argue Grey was feebleminded.
A more satisfying interpretation can be found by assuming that
Grey knew what he was doing and that Lichnowsky's hearing was
normal. Hermann Lutz hinted at this alternative in his largely overlooked Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg. In this work, he concluded that
there was no "misunderstanding" on August 1 and that the episode
7 See
Young, pp. 644-45, 660-61, 665.
8 See Imanuel
Geiss, ed., Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 2 vols. (Hanover, 1964),
2:530; and Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen (Dusseldorf, 1969), p. 724.
9 Young, pp. 663-65. Young placed great stock in the fact that both Grey and
Lichnowsky, in "independent" accounts of August 1 written later that month, stated
that Lichnowsky had not understood the inclusion of Russia in a Franco-German standoff. Since the two men met with each other on August 3 and again on August 5, one
must, however, question the value of these "independent" explanations. It should be
mentioned that the Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges of August 1 are not discussed by either
of Grey's principal biographers. See George M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Boston,
1937); and Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey (London, 1971).
10 Luigi Albertini, Le origini della guerra del 1914, 3 vols. (Milan, 1942-43), cited
here in The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella Massey (London, 1952-57), 3:368,
385. With respect to the "misunderstanding" itself, he wrote on p. 382 of the same
volume, "It is, moreover, obvious that he [Lichnowsky] can hardly have misunderstood
first Tyrrell and then Grey, who over the telephone had put the direct question."
1 Edward
Corp, "Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British Foreign
Office, 1912-1915," Historical Journal 25, no. 3 (1982): 705.
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"was a stage in the struggle between Grey's followers and the majority
of the Cabinet and an attempt, born of necessity, to keep France out of
the war in the event of the interventionists failing to carry the day."12
Lutz, unfortunately, failed to explain himself further. Nevertheless,
Grey's cabinet problems influenced his diplomacy significantly. The
Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges should be viewed as a part of his effort to
ameliorate the effects of a war he feared England would not enter.
Furthermore, Grey so detested war that even after he was satisfied the
cabinet would permit intervention, he attempted to pressure France
into taking steps that would prevent the war.
Grey's attempts to mediate between the powers in the wake of the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28 have been ably
treated elsewhere.13 Suffice it to say that Grey only brought the matter
to the attention of the cabinet on July 23, after his peaceful overtures
fell on deaf ears and the crisis deepened with Austria's ultimatum to
Serbia. At the meeting of Monday, July 27, he received no clear mandate for action from his colleagues. Finding himself thus constrained,
Grey deftly turned necessity into virtue and over the next few days
stressed England's "free hand" in an attempt to strengthen pacific
councils in Berlin and Paris.
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia reached the Foreign Office
the evening of July 28. The next afternoon, Grey again pressed the
cabinet for a declaration of support for France, but that body adjourned without taking a stand. The cabinet had "decided not to decide" as John Burns recorded in his diary.'4 Grey, therefore, used
England's uncertain position to best advantage by telling the French
and the Germans exactly what they did not want to hear. After discussing the European situation with Lichnowsky that afternoon, Grey
warned him that he should not be misled by their cordial conversation
into believing that England could stand aloof, should France and Germany enter the conflict. In his dispatch to Sir Edward Goschen, his
ambassador in Berlin, Grey wrote that he had told Lichnowsky, "If
Germany became involved in it [war], and then France, the issue might
be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not
wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation-which
I hoped would continue-into thinking that we should stand aside." 15
12Hermann
Lutz, Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1927), cited here in Lord
Grey and the World War, trans. E. W. Dickes (London, 1928), p. 296.
13 For
example, see Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above). The "misunderstanding" of August 1,
is not mentioned in any of the essays.
14 Burns Diary, July 29, 1914, British Library Additional MS 46336.
15
Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 286, pp. 182-83.
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That morning, Grey had told French Ambassador Paul Cambon
what the gist of his talk with Lichnowsky would be, with one major
alteration. Lest the French act on the assumption of English support,
Grey insisted that, "if Germany became involved and France became
involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a
case we should have to consider. France would then be drawn into a
quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her
honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us
to do."16 Grey thus attempted to force Berlin and Paris to consider the
prospect of a general war in the worst possible light: for France a war
without, and for Germany a war against, Britain.
On the morning of July 30, Grey could believe that Berlin had
provided him ammunition for his battle in the cabinet. Goschen had
telegraphed that German Chancellor Theobold von BethmannHollweg had intimated that, if England maintained its neutrality, Germany would guarantee the postwar integrity of Belgium and France.
This pledge of "self-restraint" did not include the French colonies.
Furthermore, Germany would respect the neutrality and integrity of
Holland, so long as Germany's enemies did likewise. Goschen continued: "As regards Belgium, his Excellency could not tell to what
operations Germany might be forced by the action of France, but he
could state that, provided that Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion of the
war." 17After reading this telegram, Assistant Under Secretary of State
Sir Eyre Crowe noted in a minute that "it is of interest to note that
Germany practically admits the intention to violate Belgian neutrality."18 The German suggestion that England acquiesce in the invasion of Belgium, as well as in the eventual seizure of French colonies,
provoked Grey to "a white heat of passion.""' He convinced Prime
Minister Herbert Asquith to sanction an immediate rejection of this
proposal. The cabinet approved this course the next day.20
But even after this evidence of German intentions, the cabinet
refused to take a firm line with Berlin. It only agreed that "British
opinion would not enable us to support France-a violation of Belgium
might alter public opinion, but we could say nothing to commit ourGrey to Bertie, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 283, p. 180.
Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 293, pp. 185-86.
18 Ibid.
19
Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 81.
20
Grey to Goschen, July 30, 1914, BD11, no. 303, pp. 193-94. Sir Edward Grey
(Viscount Grey of Fallodon), Twenty-Five Years, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), 1:329.
16
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selves."21 In spite of the cabinet's caution, Grey, on July 31, "took a
diplomatic step that contemplated the contingency of war."22 He asked
Paris and Berlin whether or not they would respect the neutrality of
Belgium provided that all other powers did likewise. Given the German
proposal of the day before, he could expect an ambiguous response
from Berlin.
Meanwhile, Grey continued to disappoint the German and French
ambassadors in private interviews. Before the cabinet met on July 31,
Lichnowsky had again heard that "if France became involved we
[England] should be drawn in."23 Cambon had also received discouraging news. Grey denied that there was any connection between the
present situation and the Agadir crisis of 1911 when Britain had supported France against Germany. He contended that "in this case
France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers."24 He also
denied the charge that Britain's attitude had encouraged German
militarists and pointed out he had told Lichnowsky that England would
be drawn into a Franco-German war. But Cambon could take no comfort in this assertion because Grey subsequently qualified it. As Grey
explained in a telegram to Sir Francis Bertie, his offer, "of course, was
not the same thing as a definite engagement to France, and I told M.
Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the
impression we would stand aside." When told Britain "cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war," Cambon begged Grey to
reconsider. Grey replied that the cabinet would reconsider the situation in the event of new developments but could give no pledge at that
moment.25
Word of Russia's general mobilization reached London at approximately five o'clock on July 31.26 At midnight, the German embassy sent
a note to the Foreign Office that concluded that the Russian action
"affected Germany, whose mediation had been solicited by the Tsar
personally. We were compelled, unless we wished to abandon the
safety of the Fatherland, to answer this action, which could only be
regarded as hostile, with serious counter-measures. We could not idly
watch Russia mobilizing on our frontier. We therefore told Russia that
21

Quoted in Hazlehurst, p. 84.
Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1:329.
23
Grey to Goschen, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 340, pp. 215-16.
24
Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 352, p. 220.
25 Ibid., no. 367, pp. 226-27.
26
Buchanan to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD 11, no. 347, p. 218. This telegram arrived at
5:20 P.M. on July 31. See the note added to the document that corrects the date the
telegram was sent. Asquith announced news of the mobilization to the House of Commons at about five o'clock.
22
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if she did not stop her warlike measures against Germany and AustriaHungary within twelve hours, we should mobilize, and that would
mean war [emphasis added]. We asked France whether in a RussoGerman war she would remain neutral."27 The German note prompted
Asquith to draft for King George a message which begged the Tsar "to
leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace."28
Other dispatches flooded the Foreign Office in the early morning
of August 1, confirming the drift toward war. News of Belgian mobilization reached the Foreign Office at 12:35 A.M.29Less than three hours
later, Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, reported
France's resolve to respect Belgian neutrality; France would act otherwise only as a defensive measure, given prior violation by "some other
power."30 Yet Goschen wired from Berlin that Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow "gave me to understand he rather
doubted whether they could answer at all [regarding German respect of
Belgian borders], as any reply they might give could not fail, in the
event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain
extent part of their plan of campaign."31 At 8:00 A.M. the Foreign Office
received still more electrifying news: "Vice-consul at Belgrade telephones town being bombarded and shells falling around British Legation."32 Hostilities had commenced; barring quick action, war would
soon spread to Russia, Germany, and France. What could Grey do to
prevent war while at the same time preparing the cabinet for possible
intervention?
Obviously, Grey's crucial battle would be waged within the
cabinet. But what diplomatic options remained open to him? Throughout much of the day, Grey still thought in terms of avoiding a general
war; as late as 3:10 P.M., he telegraphed to Goschen that "I still believe
that if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
begins war [emphasis added] it might be possible to secure peace."33
At this juncture, Grey believed he could do no more to influence Berlin. For three days, the Kaiser had been receiving the threat-as yet
empty-of English participation in a Franco-German war. Grey could
say nothing more to deter Germany.
Thus, in appraising the situation on the morning of August 1, Grey
27

BDll, July 31, 1914, no. 372, pp. 229-30.
Grey to Buchanan, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 384, pp. 235-36. See also Herbert
Asquith, Moments of Memory: Recollections and Impressions (London, 1937), p. 198.
29
Villiers to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 377, p. 233.
30 Bertie to
Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 382, p. 234.
31 Goschen to
Grey, July 31, 1914, BD1l, no. 383, pp. 234-35.
32
Crackanthorpe to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD 11, no. 388, p. 237.
33 Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BDll,
no. 411, p. 246.
28
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worked under the assumptions that, with war imminent, (1) he could
not dissuade Berlin and (2) the cabinet would not sanction intervention
on behalf of France. This disagreeable situation demanded drastic action, lest the Germans defeat the French as they had in 1870-71. At
11:14 A.M., Lichnowsky cabled that "Sir Edward Grey has just sent
word to me by Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes that he will be able this
afternoon, as a result of a council of ministers [Ministerberatung] that
is just taking place, to make a statement to me which may prove helpful
in preventing the great catastrophe. To judge by a remark of Sir W.
Tyrrell's, this seems to mean that in the event of our not attacking
France, England too, would remain neutral and would guarantee
France's passivity. I shall learn the details this afternoon."34
What was Grey doing? Without the sanction of the cabinet, let
alone the French, he was apparently offering Anglo-French neutrality
to Germany. But under what circumstances? Both Grey and Lichnowsky subsequently maintained that Lichnowsky had missed Grey's
proposal that Germany should attack neither France nor Russia. Given
the context of the exchange, however, this argument is unconvincing.
At that moment, Austria and Serbia were at war, Russia's partial
mobilization had become general, and Germany threatened its own
mobilization, which meant war unless Russia cancelled its mobilization. Those endorsing the "misunderstanding thesis" rest their case on
the dubious assumption that Grey was asking Germany to stand aside
and watch Russia crush Berlin's Austro-Hungarian ally. The Kaiser
could not be expected to take such a proposal seriously. On these
grounds alone, let alone on those to be discussed below, it is evident
that Grey actually proposed Anglo-French neutrality in a RussoGerman war to Lichnowsky.
Grey fully realized the magnitude of his action, and he may well
have sought the advice of his closest friends; he apparently met with
Asquith and Lord Chancellor Haldane at 10:30 A.M., half an hour before the cabinet met.35 No minutes of this meeting exist, but it is likely
Grey's colleagues advised him to be absolutely sure of such a step
34

Lichnowskyto Jagow, August 1, 1914,DD3, no. 562, p. 66.

35 See Young(n. 4 above), p. 657. He notedthatthe strongestevidencethatthey met

"is providedby Lichnowskywhose cable of 11:14a.m. reportedthatthe proposalTyrrell
had just vaguely indicated to him would issue from a ministerial consultation
which was takingplace at that moment.AfterTyrrellleft him, as the
[Ministerberatung]
princereportedfurtherin his cable, Grey called himby telephoneand saidthathe would
makeuse of the prince'sassurancewith regardto Francein 'today'scabinetmeeting,'an
obviously differentgatheringfrom the one takingplace when Tyrrellfirst came to the
Germanembassy." Haldanealso mentionedthis meetingin a letter to his mother.See
Hazelhurst(n. 1 above), p. 90.
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before he presented it to the cabinet. Just prior to the cabinet meeting, Grey telephoned the German ambassador to ask "whether I
[Lichnowsky] thought I could give an assurance that in the event of
France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and Germany we
should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the
responsibility for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at
today's Cabinet meeting." 36 Though sent in one telegram at 11:14 A.M.,
Lichnowsky's dispatch mentioned two different communications with
Grey: Tyrrell's mission and Grey's phone call. Significantly, in this
second exchange, Lichnowsky made explicit reference to French neutrality during a Russo-German war, which obviously contradicts the
"misunderstanding" thesis. When reduced to its essentials, this narrative indicates that Grey, in return for guaranteeing French neutrality,
received an assurance that Germany would not attack France in a
Russo-German war. In other words, Grey suggested that France and
England would stand aside and view the defeat of Serbia and Russia.
Albertini commented that the kaiser, the chancellor, and their advisors
at the Schloss were so blinded with elation that they "never stopped to
ask themselves whether they were dreaming or whether Grey had gone
crazy."
It may be regardedas certainthat on the morningof 1 AugustGrey really
believed in the possibilityof promisingGermanythat Franceand England
would remainneutral.The idea was in every sense absurd.It was inconceivable that France would betray her ally and leave her at the mercy of
Austria and Germany,while it was easy to foresee that, once victory in
the east had been gained, Germany would turn her strength against
France.... Once Francehad been beaten the same fate would sooner or
later have overtakenBritain.It seems impossiblethat Grey can ever have
entertainedsuch an idea. And yet he did so.37
In these comments, however, Albertini failed to consider Grey's position vis-a-vis the cabinet. When Grey sent Tyrrell on his errand and
when he called Lichnowsky just before 11:00 A.M., he had to assume
that the cabinet would not sanction intervention. Given this scenario,
Grey would be forced to inform Paris that England definitely would not
intervene in a Balkan quarrel. Salvaging something from the situation,
he could, at least, offer the French Lichnowsky's guarantee that Germany would not attack if France remained neutral. Paris, no doubt
ringing with cries of "Perfide Albion," would then face two dis36
37

Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 562, p. 66.
Albertini (n. 10 above), 3:381, 382-83.
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agreeable choices: to fight and risk probable defeat, or to abandon
Russia and remain neutral. Grey could hope that the French would be
rational and choose the second option. Given the lack of Anglo-French
support, Russia would then presumably have to avoid war with Germany and Austria. The result would be Austria's crushing of Serbia
and the disruption of both the Anglo-French Entente and the FrancoRussian Alliance, but no general war. Germany and the Central Powers
would have won a significant victory. However, Grey could believe
that this was not too high a price to pay, given that the alternative
would be the probable establishment of German continental hegemony
while England remained idle.
With Lichnowsky's word in his pocket, Grey faced the cabinet.
During the meeting, Winston Churchill was denied permission to
mobilize the navy. The cabinet also decided that it still could not propose that Parliament send an expeditionary force to the continent.38
But Grey, faced with the apparent realization of his worst fears of
enforced neutrality, did not choose to make use of Lichnowsky's
pledge, nor, for that matter, did he reveal that he had even talked with
the German ambassador that morning. Why not?
Belgium provides the only plausible answer. The cabinet did give
Grey permission to tell Lichnowsky that, "if there were a violation of
the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected
it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country."39 Though Grey that evening said that he would have to have a
"tussle" with the cabinet the next day, one must conclude that he
believed this statement to be a decisive step toward intervention in the
impending war. It is otherwise difficult to account for Grey's failure to
mention Lichnowsky's pledge to his colleagues.
However, Grey saw quite well that there yet remained a chance
that his plan for intervention would not work. The cabinet adjourned at
around 1:30 P.M. At 2:10 P.M., Lichnowsky cabled Berlin that "Sir
William Tyrrell has just been to see me and told me that Sir Edward
Grey wants this afternoon to make proposals for England's neutrality,
even in the event of our being at war with France as well as Russia. I
shall see Sir Edward at 3:30 and shall report at once."40 Whereas
previously Grey had spoken of French neutrality, his scenario now
included France in a continental war. Why the change? Grey realized
that the key to British intervention was Belgium, and that it could still
38
39
40

Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 426, p. 253.
Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD1, no. 448, pp. 260-61.
Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 570, p. 70.
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fail him in either of two instances: (1) German respect for Belgian
neutrality or (2) a lack of Belgian resistance to German invasion. By
August 1, if not earlier, a German attack on France through Belgium
seemed probable.41 But would the Belgians actively defend themselves? Grey's "tussle" in the cabinet would be difficult indeed if he
sought to send British soldiers to die for the honor of Belgium while
Belgian soldiers remained mere neutral observers or offered only token
resistance.
So long as the ultimate Belgian response remained uncertain, Grey
still had to plan for any eventuality. The proposal made to Lichnowsky
after the cabinet meeting left the door open for Britain and Grey to
salvage something from the debacle caused if Belgium allowed German
troops passage through the country. In that event, Grey might yet
wring concessions from a Germany still eager to buy British neutrality,
even if he had to accept a deal along the lines of Bethmann-Hollweg's
offer of July 30.
Fortunately for Grey, the Belgians were resolute. Grey probably
had a good impression of Brussels's intentions when the cabinet met,
for, as noted above, the Foreign Office had received word of Belgium's
general mobilization at 12:35 A.M. that morning. However, Grey received "encouraging if not conclusive" news from Sir Francis Villiers,
the British ambassador at Brussels, when he had a chance to review
information received while the cabinet met.42 In a telegram that arrived
at 12:25 P.M., Villiers reported that the Belgian minister of foreign
affairs stated "that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain
neutrality, and desires and expects other powers to observe and uphold it.
"He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the
neighboring Powers were excellent and that there was no reason to
suspect their intentions, but that [the] Belgian Government believed
that in case of [a] violation they were in a position to defend the
neutrality of their country."43 Finally, as if he needed any further
confirmation of German intentions, at 3:00 P.M. Grey received word
from Goschen in Berlin that the "Military Attache [is] confident [that]
in [the] event of war Germany will pass part of her forces through
Belgium."44 Thus before he met with Lichnowsky, the fears that had
motivated both of Tyrrell's informal missions had been dispelled: the
41 Herbert Louis
Samuel, Memoirs (London, 1945), p. 101.
42
Hazlehurst, p. 99.
43
44

Villiers to Grey, August 1, 1914, BDll, no. 395, p. 240.
Goschen to Grey, August 1, 1914, BDll, no. 404, p. 243.
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cabinet had moved toward a commitment to Belgium, and the Belgians
had indicated that they would defend themselves against a German
invasion. Grey could now anticipate British participation in a European war.
Grey could not have looked forward to his 3:30 P.M.meeting with
Lichnowsky. He had, of course, made no firm offer to Germany, yet he
did face the ticklish task of dismantling his own initiatives. In a summation to Berlin of the day's exchanges as well as of his 3:30 meeting with
Grey, Lichnowsky telegraphed Berlin:
He [Grey]had been wonderingwhetherit wouldnot be possiblefor us and
France in the event of a Russianwar to remainfacing each other without
either side attacking.I asked him whetherhe was in a positionto give me
an assurance that France would agree to a pact of that sort. Since we
intendedneither to destroy France nor to annex parts of her territory,I
could imaginethat we might enter on an agreementof that sort since it
would assure us of Great Britain's neutrality.The ministersaid that he
would enquire, but was not blind to the difficultiesof restrainingtwo
armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity.45
Grey thus not only backed away from his earliest offer of French
passivity but revealed that he had made it without having consulted the
French. His answer also sheds light on another aspect of the alleged
"misunderstanding" of August 1. Lichnowsky here specifically asked
about the possibility of French neutrality during a Russo-German war,
in exact accord with his telegram of 11:14 A.M., and Grey's only reply
was a weak intimation that it might prove impossible to restrain two
mobilized armies while Germany attacked Russia; thus when offered a
perfect opportunity to tell Lichnowsky that he had misunderstood the
conditions under which he had earlier proposed Anglo-French neutrality, Grey did not do so. No misunderstanding had occurred.
At the 3:30 P.M.meeting, Lichnowsky of course did not receive the
proposals for England's neutrality during a German war with the
Franco-Russian Alliance that Tyrrell had suggested in his second trip
to the German Embassy. Rather, Grey made a statement of conditions
under which the British might intervene. The violation of Belgian neutrality of course headed the list. The German ambassador remained
calm in spite of this discouraging turn of events. He asked whether
Grey could give a definite assurance of British neutrality if Germany
agreed to respect Belgium's borders. Young wrote that "this clever
45
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question, consistent with the search for a means to assure military
passivity in the West, caught Grey unawares."46 But this question
undoubtedly embarrassed Grey more than it surprised him. Lichnowsky had exposed Grey's weakest point: to intervene, Grey needed
Belgian resistance to a German invasion because the cabinet had
shown no inclination to fight for France, let alone Serbia and Russia.
Grey could not make such a statement since the Germans might accept
the offer, spare Belgium, and thus doom his attempt to trigger English
intervention. He could only reply that a violation of Belgium would
greatly affect public opinion and make it "very difficult for the Government to adopt a benevolent neutrality."47
Lichnowsky concluded his telegram by stating the general impression that "people here would like, if at all possible, to keep out of the
war" but that the lack of a pledge to respect Belgium had made a "very
unfavorable impression."48 The German ambassador, for all intents
and purposes, considered Grey's earlier intimations no longer valid
and the affair closed.49 However, owing to the time lag involved in
communication between London and Berlin, the kaiser cabled acceptance to the first Lichnowsky telegram early that evening, which would
cause Grey acute embarrassment.
Grey had dealt with Lichnowsky as tactfully as possible.50 He no
longer harbored significant doubts that England would intervene, but
having found the means to secure involvement in a European war,
Grey so wished to avoid bloodshed that he made one last effort to keep
the peace. In a series of remarkable, if overlooked, communications
with French Ambassador Paul Cambon as well as to his ambassador in
Paris, Sir Francis Bertie, Grey attempted to bludgeon France into neutality and thus either localize or prevent the war. Bertie, in his diary
entry of July 29, provided a clue as to Grey's probable line of thought:
"The French should put pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France
and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France
46 Harry Young, Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War (Savannah, Ga., 1977),

p. 117.
47
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Albertini(n. 10 above), 3:386.
In his memoirs, perhaps as an apology to Lichnowskyfor the trouble he had
caused him, Grey wrote, "Do his [Lichnowsky's]countrymenyet recognize, not only
how clear he was of any responsibility,but the debt that is owed him for his effortsfor
peace duringthe whole of his Embassy in London? We, at any rate, rememberhim
gratefullyfor havingtriedto averta warthathas been a calamityfor everyone, victorsas
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would have to follow in her wake." 5 But by the afternoon of August 1,
the French had not managed to moderate the Russians, and Grey knew
that England, too, would follow the Russian wake into war. Grey now
took Bertie's thoughts one step further: England would pressure
France into pressuring Russia.
For their part, the French had frantically attempted, but failed, to
find a way to earn a firm pledge of English support. The French government had given a quick and affirmative reply to London's request for a
guarantee of Belgian neutrality.52 French soldiers had withdrawn ten
kilometers from the German frontier to avoid giving even the appearance of provocation.53 Finally, the French Embassy received instructions to draw Grey's attention to the Italian declaration that the present
war was not defensive and that for this reason the casusfoederis under
the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.54 The French had done all
that prudence dictated and, if nothing else, Paris could hardly expect
criticism for having drawn Britain into an aggressive war. But Grey
perceived that French caution alone was insufficient to act as a moderating influence on St. Petersburg and that stronger measures were
necessary.
He apparently began this campaign during the 10:30 A.M.meeting
with Asquith and Haldane. Lt. General Sir Henry Wilson, the director
of military operations and an ardent supporter for intervention on behalf of France, subsequently noted with disgust in his diary that "at
11:30 a.m. 'Squiff [Asquith] wrote to C.I.G.S. ... 'putting on record'
that the Govt had never promised the French the E[xpeditionary]
55
F[orce]!!" Hazlehurst concluded that Asquith's intentions regarding
this letter are impenetrable: "What is most difficult to understand is
why Asquith should have sent such a message to the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff before a cabinet decision had been taken."56
Asquith's intentions become clearer if one considers the letter as part
51
Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox, ed., The Diary of Lord Bertie, 1914-1918 (New
York, 1924), p. 5. There are other similarities between the thoughts of the two men. That
same day Bertie also wrote that "People, however, do not realize, or do not take into
account, the difficulty for the British Government to declare England solidaire with
Russia and France in a question such as the Austro-Servian [sic] quarrel." On August 2
he prophesied, "The war will not be over soon. What carnage and suffering, and how
disgusting the cause!" See Lennox, pp. 5, 9.
52 Bertie to
Grey, August 1, 1914, BD1l, no. 382, p. 234.
53 Bertie to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 403, p. 243.
54 August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 406, p. 244.
55 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above),
p. 90. Note that Wilson apparently meant that
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1:30 P.M.
56 Ibid.
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of Grey's effort to preserve peace by declaring that no formal obligation bound England to aid France. Wilson advocated cooperation with
the French and favored a declaration of support for the entente. He
was also in close contact with the French embassy57 and could be
expected to convey the contents of the letter to the French, thus serving Grey's efforts to moderate French and Russian zeal.
In his first dispatch to Bertie after his talk with Lichnowsky, Grey
continued to apply pressure: "I have definitely refused all overtures to
give Germany any promise of neutrality, and shall not entertain any
such suggestions unless it were on conditions that secured real advantages for France."58 "German Ambassador here seemed to think it not
impossible, when I suggested it [emphasis added], that after mobilization on western frontier French and German armies should remain,
neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot
say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her
alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would
not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive."59 Grey summarized for Bertie
the gist of his 11:14 A.M. exchange with Lichnowsky. However, this
was disingenuous because he had just told Lichnowsky that FrancoGerman passivity would not work because of "the difficulties of restraining the two armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity."60
But here Grey implied to Bertie that military passivity in the West
could be advantageous to France. This was surely not the sort of
statement those in Paris, counting on British support, wanted to hear.
Grey's handwritten draft of this telegram also contains clues to
what happened on August 1 that are not available to those relying on
the text provided in British Documents on the Origins of the War. Grey
at first began his draft with the word "I," which was stricken out and
for which was substituted the word "We."61 The records of the Paris
embassy reveal that this correction was made in the official telegram
sent to Bertie.62 While this is only a minor point, Grey's original wording, which was accidentally used in British Documents (cited hereafter
57 Ekstein and Steiner, in Hinsley, ed.

(n. 1 above), p. 405.
In the Paris embassy copy of this telegram, the word is "secured," not
"seemed," as is recordedin BD 11. See PRO, FO 146/4411.In Grey's originaldraft,it is
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"secured" because it was used in the embassy copy and makes more sense grammatically.
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as BD), reflected accurately the extent to which British diplomacy on
that day was his work alone. This slip on Grey's part supports the
interpretation that the principal permanent officials in the Foreign
Office, Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicholson, both of whom
strenuously urged support for France, had little influence on Grey
during the crisis.63
Grey's draft contains yet another, much more important, piece of
evidence. Historians have previously noted the significance of Grey's
admission, "when I suggested it," with respect to the prospect of
Franco-German neutrality and used it against proponents of the "misunderstanding thesis." In Grey's draft the words, "when I suggested
it," were inserted into the original text.64 Thus, this statement was not
unconsciously or mistakenly put into the dispatch; Grey wrote the
note, realized that, as written, it appeared that the proposal for FrancoGerman passivity was Lichnowsky's, and added the words "when I
suggested it" to correct this impression.
At 8:20 P.M., Grey telegraphed to Bertie an account of his afternoon interview with Cambon. He now presented the scenario portrayed in the previous telegram much more forcefully:
After the Cabinet to-day, I told M. Cambon that the present position
differedentirelyfromthat createdby the Moroccoincidents.In the latter,
Germanymade upon Francedemandsthat Francecould not grant,and in
connection with which we had undertakenspecial obligationstowards
France. In these, public opinionwould have justifiedthe BritishGovernment in supportingFranceto the utmost of theirability.Now, theposition
was that Germanywould agree not to attack France if France remained
neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany [emphasis
added].If Francecould not take advantageof this position, it was because
she was bound by an allianceto which we were not parties, and of which
we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France,but it did meanthat Francemusttake her
own decision at this momentwithout reckoningon an assistance that we
were not now in a position to promise.65
Bluntly stated, Britain could offer to spare France an invasion, and if
Paris could not accept the offer because of the alliance with Russia,
63
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France would have to act without a promise of English support. Cambon replied that he could not transmit such a statement to Paris; he was
so shaken that he asked for authorization to say, instead, that the
cabinet had not yet taken any decision-in other words, to convey the
same message which he had protested against so strongly just the day
before. Grey was adamant: "I said we had come to a decision: that we
could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expeditionary military force to the continent. Such a step had always been
regarded here as very dangerous and doubtful. It was one that we could
not propose, and Parliament would not authorise unless our interests
and obligations were deeply and desperately involved."66 He would
only admit that a German violation of Belgium or an attack on the
French coasts by the German fleet "might alter public feeling" and that
Cambon could report that the cabinet had not yet made a decision on
these points.
But would such a forceful statement lead to French pressure on
the Russians for peace? Grey had certainly gotten his point across to
Cambon. Harold Nicolson related in his biography of his father that,
after this conversation, "white and speechless, he [Cambon] staggered
into Nicolson's room. Nicolson went towards him and took his hands
to guide him to a chair. 'Ils vont nous lacher, ils vont nous lacher,' was
all that the Ambassador could say. Nicholson went upstairs to interview Sir Edward Grey. He found him pacing his room, biting at his
lower lip. Nicolson asked whether it was indeed true that we had
refused to support France at the moment of her greatest danger. Grey
made no answer beyond a gesture of despair. 'You will render us,'
Nicholson said angrily, 'a by-word among nations.'"67
Bertie was similarly affected. On August 2, in despair over England's apparent inaction, he confided in his diary, "It will not be long
now before it is 'Perfide Albion.'" Marked "later," under the same
day, he lamented, "I have been feeling so sick at heart, and ashamed,
that 'Perfide Albion' should really be applicable. I suppose the hope is
that the French will win without us, but if they do, and that is doubtful,
we should not receive much consideration in the Treaty of Peace at the
end of the war; and if the Germans be the conquerers what will be our
fate?" 68
66Ibid.
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He need not have worried. After his 8:20 P.M. telegram to Paris,
Grey never again placed such extreme pressure on France. But why
did he abandon the course he had steadfastly pursued throughout the
day? The turning point for Grey occurred shortly after he sent this
telegram to Bertie, when the kaiser's acceptance of Grey's "proposal"
of French passivity arrived in London. Those unaware of Grey's maneuvers, quite possibly everyone in the Foreign Office except for Tyrrell, could only be shocked to learn that the kaiser had "just received
the communication from your Government offering French neutrality
under guarantee of Great Britain."69
Grey received word to present himself at Buckingham Palace to
explain the kaiser's telegram and draft a reply. Sometime between 8:30
and 9:30 P.M., he penciled that "there must be some misunderstanding
as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince
Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon."70 Thus the birth of
the myth that has since puzzled scholars. King George's reply flogged
again the dead horse of Franco-German neutrality that both Grey and
Lichnowsky considered buried after their 3:30 P.M.meeting. But Berlin
did not receive word of the results of that meeting until 10:02 P.M.,
hours after the kaiser sent his telegram to London.
The meeting with the king meant the end of Grey's hope of
avoiding war by pressuring France into neutrality. He realized that
once he had to reject openly the idea of Franco-German neutrality, he
could no longer use it as a means to influence French diplomacy.
Although Grey had failed to secure peace, Belgium's resolve to defend
its neutrality allowed Grey to take some comfort. England ultimately
would not abandon France.
Historians have ignored the evidence that suggests that the king's
telegram to the kaiser marked a turning point for Grey's diplomacy.
The minutes under the 3:30 A.M. telegram of 1 August, whereby the
German government refused to guarantee Belgian neutrality, contain
the notation: "Repeat to Paris (no. 300 Aug 1, 9:45 p.m. [emphasis
added])."7' The Foreign Office had held this information for over eighteen hours, apparently only forwarding it to Paris on Grey's return
from his audience with the king. Was this mere inefficiency or coincidence? It seems unlikely. Almost concurrently with this telegram (BD
69 Kaiser Wilhelm to
King George, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 575, pp. 74-75. Furthermore, word arrived soon after of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Given that
Grey had still hoped for peace "before any Great Power begins war," such news effectively ended all hope of avoiding war. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 411,
p. 246.
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no. 383), Goschen had sent another telegram to Grey (BD no. 385),
which arrived fifteen minutes after the neutrality statement but which
was repeated to Paris at 1:45 P.M., a full eight hours earlier.72 Grey,
who had told Cambon of the important role played by Belgium with
respect to British public opinion, with this telegram at last conveyed an
encouraging message to Paris.
Winston Churchill gave further testimony that Grey's diplomacy
changed after the kaiser's telegram. When Churchill received word of
Germany's declaration of war on Russia shortly after 9:30 P.M., he told
Asquith of his intention to mobilize the fleet. Asquith did not disapprove, and, as Churchill left, Grey told him: "You should know I have
just done a very important thing. I have told Cambon that we shall not
allow the German fleet to come into the Channel."73 Cambon fully
realized the significance of this pledge. Though it is clear that he was,
in fact, referring to the events of August 1, 1914, in a letter to his son on
August 2, 1916, he wrote: "The day of 2 August 1914 is the one in
which I spent the gravest moments of my life. It was only in the
evening about ten p.m. that Grey sent to me the paper by which the
British Government promised to protect our coasts. That sufficed to
involve England against Germany. The next day, Belgian territory was
violated and English intervention became obligatory to the eyes of the
most recalcitrant."74 Grey's efforts to keep the peace thus ended on
the evening of August 1.
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Cambon'sno. 171 is so consistent because in this telegramCambondid not mention
Grey's offeringany supportto France or Belgium. In no. 172, Cambonreportedthat
Grey "will demandauthorizationto declareMondayto the House of Commonsthatthe
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Grey finally had his "tussle" with the cabinet on August 2. The
letter of summation the cabinet sent to the King showed that Grey's
assumption on August 1 about the future direction of the cabinet had
been correct: "It was agreed, without any attempt to state a formula,
that it would be made evident that a substantial violation of the neutrality of that country [Belgium] would place us in the situation contemplated as possible by Mr. Gladstone in 1870, when interference was
held to compel us to take action." 75Hazlehurst wrote that this guarded
formula indeed meant that "the point of no return had been
reached."76
At 4:00 P.M. on Monday, August 3, Grey addressed the House of
Commons, which gave receptive cheers in support of a British defense
of Belgium. At six o'clock "the Secretary of State was leaning gloomily by the window. Nicolson congratulated him on the success of his
speech. Sir Edward did not answer. He moved to the center of the
room and raised his hands with clenched fists above his head. He
brought his fists with a crash upon the table. 'I hate war' he groaned 'I
hate war.' "77
Clearly there was no "misunderstanding" on August 1, 1914.
Rather, historians have misunderstood Grey's attempt to make contingency plans through Lichnowsky in case a continental war found England neutral. The mere fact that he had been forced to guard against
such a situation must have been highly distasteful to Grey, who allowed the "misunderstanding" myth to cloak the affair.
More important, within Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, there
struggled two absolute convictions: (1) that the unfolding situation
must not result in a European war but (2) that, if it did, England must
stand beside France and Russia. By his actions of that day, Grey gave
precedence to the former, since he toiled for peace long after the
cabinet had taken what he considered to be significant steps toward
intervention. But Berlin dashed Grey's last efforts at peace with its
retarded acceptance of the long-dead proposal of French neutrality. A
European war and British intervention remained the only alternative.78
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